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Harold J. Krent† 
Abstract 
Commentators long have debated the scope of the Chief Executive’s 
role in overseeing, enforcing, and at times reshaping the many programs 
and policies enacted by Congress. The question of the President’s 
authority over adjudications that Congress has entrusted to admini-
strative agencies has been examined less frequently. The tension is 
clear: on the one hand, the President should have inherent authority to 
manage the adjudications that Congress has seen fit to entrust to 
agencies to resolve; but on the other, political control over adjudication 
seems anathema to rights of litigants asserting claims against the 
government itself. Congress, therefore, may seek to curtail the executive 
branch’s control of the adjudicative process to provide greater rights 
for individuals and firms involved in adjudications within the executive 
branch.  
Accordingly, this Article first examines the scope of the President’s 
Article II authority to manage adjudications within the executive 
branch. The Article initially notes, as have others, that the Supreme 
Court has limited the President’s removal and (to some extent) 
appointment authority over officials engaged in adjudication, as op-
posed to other functions within the executive branch. The Article then 
argues that Congress, accordingly, should also be able to delimit the 
President’s general Article II managerial authority over adjudicative 
officials more than those exercising enforcement and regulatory 
functions. Finally, the Article considers congressional directives that 
curb executive management efforts, particularly the recent Veterans 
Access Act that altered the disciplinary appeal route for SES employees 
in the Veterans Administration and the congressional specification in 
the Administrative Procedure Act that Administrative Law Judges 
(“ALJs”) enjoy decisional independence. The Article concludes that 
such congressional direction, if clear, should displace the executive 
interest, in the first example, of preserving the role of the Merit Systems 
Protection Board in overseeing all federal employee discipline cases and, 
in the second example, in removing from office ALJs whom the 
employing agency believes do not competently interpret the law, apply 
agency policy, or find facts. 
 
† Dean and Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
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Introduction 
Commentators long have debated the scope of the Chief Executive’s 
role in overseeing, enforcing, and at times reshaping the many programs 
and policies enacted by Congress. The Supreme Court has weighed in 
on conflicts between Congress’s Article I powers and the Chief 
Executive’s Article II authority often, most recently curbing the 
President’s Recess Appointment authority.1  
The question of the President’s authority over adjudications that 
Congress has entrusted to administrative agencies has been examined 
less frequently. The tension is clear: on the one hand, the President 
should have inherent authority to manage the adjudications that 
Congress has seen fit to entrust to agencies to resolve; but on the other, 
political control over adjudication seems anathema to rights of litigants 
asserting claims against the government itself. Congress, therefore, may 
seek to curtail the executive branch’s control of the adjudicative process 
to provide rights for individuals and firms involved in adjudications 
within the executive branch.2  
This Article first examines the scope of the President’s Article II 
authority to manage adjudications within the executive branch. This 
Article initially notes, as have others, that the Supreme Court has 
limited the President’s removal and (to some extent) appointment 
authority over officials engaged in adjudication as opposed to other 
functions within the executive branch. The Article then argues that 
Congress, accordingly, should be able to delimit the President’s more  
1. NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014). 
2. Theoretically, Congress could direct the President or administrative 
agency to afford litigants fewer rights as well. 
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general Article II managerial authority over adjudicative officials as 
well. Finally, this Article considers the propriety of congressional di-
rectives that curb executive management efforts, particularly the con-
gressional specification in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)3 
that Administrative Law Judges enjoy decisional independence.  
I. The Nature of Adjudication Within 
the Executive Branch 
Congress long has delegated extensive authority to the executive 
branch to adjudicate a wide variety of claims against the government, 
as reflected currently in the millions of immigration, veterans, and 
Social Security Disability cases resolved each year.4 Moreover, it has 
delegated authority (albeit less commonly) for agencies to adjudicate 
disputes among private parties, as between labor and management 
under the National Labor Relations Act,5 and formerly between 
shippers and common carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act.6 
Adjudicatory authority is a familiar feature of agency terrain. 
In placing adjudications within the executive branch, Congress 
presumably intends agencies, at least at times, to exercise policymaking 
through adjudication.7 As within any common law system, rules to 
govern future behavior emerge through the adjudicative process. 
Private individuals and firms consult the decisions to order their 
behavior in the future. Congress cannot, of course, delegate traditional 
private rights to the executive branch for adjudication, but it can 
 
3. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012). 
4. See Veterans Benefits Administration Reports, U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs, http://www.benefits.va.gov/reports/detailed_ 
claims_data.asp (May 2, 2015) (showing more than half a million pending 
claims as of February 2015); Backlog of Pending Immigration Cases as of 
March 2015, Trac Immigration http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/ 
immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php (last visited May 6, 
2015) (showing more than 400,000 pending claims); Annual Statistical 
Supplement, 2014, Social Security Administration, http://ssa.gov/ 
policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2014/2f4-2f6.html (last visited Feb. 
16, 2015) (showing more than three million received disability insurance 
claims in fiscal year 2013).  
5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
6. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 238–46 (1973). 
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“To insist upon 
one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over 
necessity.”); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) 
(“[S]urely the Board has discretion to decide that the adjudicative 
procedures in this case may also produce the relevant information 
necessary to mature and fair consideration of the issues.”). 
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delegate a panoply of public rights for executive branch adjudication,8 
whether before Article I courts or administrative agencies. 
Consider litigation within the Securities and Exchange Commiss-
ion. If the President could no longer appoint or remove SEC Commiss-
ioners, a court might conclude that he had insufficient influence over 
elaboration of critical financial policy. Adjudication within the 
executive branch involves not only factfinding but policy elaboration. 
Agencies such as the NLRB make policy almost exclusively through 
adjudication,9 and it was the SEC’s policymaking authority that trig-
gered one of the Supreme Court decisions most deferential to agency 
policymaking through adjudication.10 In SEC v. Chenery, the Court 
upheld the agency’s authority to fashion new policy in the midst of a 
utility reorganization and then to apply that policy retroactively, stress-
ing that the agency “has drawn heavily upon its accumulated 
experience in dealing with utility reorganizations. And it has expressed 
its reasons with a clarity and thoroughness that admit of no doubt as 
to the underlying basis of its order.”11 Moreover, those rules can be 
articulated in adjudications because “[t]here is . . . a very definite place 
for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.”12 
Policymaking, therefore, frequently arises out of the adjudications 
that Congress entrusts to the executive branch. Agencies are to inter-
pret gaps in statutes and regulations13 and determine the broad frame-
works within which facts are to be assessed. And, as the Supreme Court 
famously explained in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly 
rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to 
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable 
to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate 
for this political branch of the Government to make such policy 
choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself  
8. Congress can, however, delegate private rights that have been federalized. 
See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 594 
(1985) (upholding a federal statute requiring arbitration of private 
disputes arising from a government registration scheme).  
9. Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in 
Pragmatism, 41 Duke L.J. 274, 274 (1991); see also Bell Aerospace Co., 
416 U.S. at 293–94 (discussing previous cases in which the NLRB set 
policy through adjudication). 
10. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202–03. 
11. Id. at 199. 
12. Id. at 203. 
13. Courts defer to statutory construction under the familiar Chevron 
construct. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). 
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either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be 
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the 
statute in light of everyday realities. 14 
Absent sufficient say in development of that policy, Presidents could 
no longer superintend development of the tasks delegated to the 
executive branch by Congress. 
Aside from policymaking through statutory interpretation or 
crafting rules in adjudication, agencies also make policy less directly by 
crafting presumptions arising in adjudication. The Supreme Court has 
upheld the agency’s right to create such presumptions in particular 
factual contexts. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,15 the question 
presented was whether an employer impermissibly discharged three 
employees for wearing UAW-CIO union steward buttons.16 The 
employer argued that if it allowed employees to wear such buttons, 
employees would think that it implicitly favored that union, and it 
would thereby interfere with its employees’ choice of a representative. 
The statutory touchstone was whether the employer’s conduct discrim-
inated against the employees by discharging them because of protected 
conduct. Motive is the linchpin. The Board created a presumption that 
an employer’s permission for employees to wear union steward buttons, 
at least where there was no competing labor organization at the plant, 
did not imply recognition or support of that particular union. The 
Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, reasoning that, after a hearing, an 
agency may “infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts 
such conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven.”17 
Agencies can generate rebuttable presumptions based upon the 
likelihood that certain facts constitute evidence of a statutory violation. 
Those presumptions reflect policymaking. 
Agencies not only can create presumptions, but they also can derive 
inferences from sets of facts based on their particular knowledge of the 
field. Even through factfinding, agencies fashion a type of subsidiary 
policy. When agencies decide the weight to be accorded certain facts, 
or the likelihood that particular facts will occur in tandem, they set 
precedent for future decision makers. Those inferences, while not 
governing private parties directly, set policy for future adjudications 
and affect the rights of private parties. In Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. 
NLRB,18 for example, the principal question concerned whether 
companies had wrongfully terminated two employees in derogation of 
 
14. Id. at 865–66. 
15. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
16. Id. at 795.  
17. Id. at 800. 
18. 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).  
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their statutory rights protected under the National Labor Relations 
Act.19 The ALJ, after hearing all of the testimony, credited the 
testimony of the employer’s supervisor that the employees were dis-
missed because of the slow pace of their work. The NLRB, however, 
reversed the ALJ, concluding that because the supervisor knew the 
employees were leaders of an organizational effort at the worksite and 
had not previously warned the employees, the discharge was pretextual. 
The court of appeals agreed that it was the agency’s province to derive 
inferences from the facts and thereby set policy.20 
Consider, as well, the more recent decision in Elliott v. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission.21 There, the issue concerned whether 
brokers had engaged in prearranged, and therefore illegal, trades of 
commodities.22 The ALJ sided with the brokers, relying on the 
testimony of the brokers and two other traders. The ALJ concluded 
that the trades had not been prearranged but rather that the market 
had provided only limited competition. The Commodities Future 
Trading Commission reversed, relying instead on the structure and 
timing of the trades. From the pattern of trading, it inferred that they 
were prearranged and hence in violation of the commodities act. 
On review, a divided Seventh Circuit upheld the agency. It held 
that the agency acted within its expertise in overturning the ALJ’s 
factfinding based on the inferences it drew from the patterns. In sup-
port, it provided an oversimplified example: 
[A] police officer can testify that he was suspicious of a driver 
because he thought it unusual that a car was driving slowly and 
not using turn signals. The officer would be allowed to draw 
inferences from these facts without presenting evidence that cars 
usually drive faster on that particular street (much less evidence 
of the normal speed at which they drive). The factfinder could 
rely on its own experience to conclude that this sort of behavior 
was out of the ordinary.23 
The agency thus can use its experience to derive inferences from factual 
patterns arising within its expertise and set agency policy for the future. 
 
19. Id. at 1076. In the particular case, however, a majority of the court 
determined that the Board’s derivative inferences stemmed in part from 
discredited testimony and thus concluded that the discharge of the em-
ployees should be upheld. Id. at 1083–84.  
20. Id. at 1078–79; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 482 F.3d 
1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (“When, as here, the Board accepts the ALJ’s 
basic factual and credibility determinations, it may draw inferences and 
conclusions from them different from the ALJ’s.” (citing Int’l Union v. 
NLRB, 834 F.2d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1987))). 
21. 202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2000). 
22. Id. at 927. 
23. Id. at 936.  
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At stake, therefore, is control over administrative policy delegated 
by Congress. When Congress delegates adjudications to the executive 
branch, should Presidents have equal say in controlling the policy 
generated through adjudication as through rulemaking and enforce-
ment? 
II. A Brief History of Adjudication Within 
the Executive Branch 
A turn to history does not help illuminate the question above be-
cause, for the few adjudications delegated by Congress to the executive 
branch in the first years of the nation, Presidents exercised virtually 
unfettered discretion in molding the adjudications. Congress delegated 
adjudicative authority to the executive branch without limiting Presi-
dential control to any extent. As a result, the policy emerging from the 
delegated authority reflected that of the President, and there was no 
need to accommodate a congressional interest in safeguarding adjudi-
cative independence with the President’s interest in superintending 
delegated authority.  
In the Founding generation, the executive branch assessed claims 
against it in a variety of ways. For instance, in the first generation, 
Commissioners and others assessed claims for pensions without the 
niceties of formal litigation. Executive control was plenary, and the 
right of judicial review nonexistent. In the absence of direction from 
Congress, the executive sought to manage the adjudication as efficiently 
as possible. Executive control over adjudication was similar to that over 
policymaking generally. 
With respect to veterans’ claims, the first Congress provided 
compensation to disabled veterans.24 The act, however, did not include 
a claims resolution or adjudication mechanism. The implication was 
that the executive should proceed as it deemed appropriate. In 1792, 
Congress remedied that oversight in passing the Invalid Pension Act, 
which assigned Article III judges the task of recommending eligibility 
for pensions to the Secretary of War.25 The Supreme Court later held 
that Congress could not, consistent with the dictates of an independent 
judiciary under Article III, impose nonjudicial duties upon Article III 
judges.26 The Court reasoned that the claims resolution process involved 
nonjudicial duties because the Secretary of War enjoyed the final say 
 
24. An Act Providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United 
States, 1 Stat. 95 (1789). 
25. An Act to Provide for the Settlement of the Claims of Widows and 
Orphans Barred by the Limitations Heretofore Established and to 
Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions, 1 Stat. 243 (1792). 
26. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.2 (1792). 
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as to whether the pensions would be paid.27 Congress responded in 1803 
by vesting the authority to decide claims directly in the Secretary of 
War, thereby removing the judges from the process altogether.28 Under 
the Revolutionary War Pension Act in 1818,29 all veterans could receive 
benefits if they could show that they had served and were in “reduced 
circumstances.”30 By that Act, disability was no longer the touchstone 
for receiving benefits.31 The executive branch, therefore, fleshed out the 
meaning of “reduced circumstances” in the diverse contexts in which 
veterans lived. 
Practice under the 1818 Act is illustrative. Claims evidently were 
considered either by pension clerks working directly for the Pension 
Bureau or by state judges. There were no formal hearings, and the 
clerks and state judges made decisions on the papers submitted by the 
veterans.32 Disappointed claimants could appeal to Congress for a 
private bill of relief. When, later in the century, claimants attempted 
to access the courts, the Supreme Court rebuffed the effort on the 
ground that “[n]o pensioner has a vested legal right to his pension. 
Pensions are the bounties of the government, which Congress has the 
right to give, withhold, distribute, or recall, at its discretion.”33 
Accordingly, the process accorded claimants was of no legal impor-
tance,34 and Congress vested in the executive full control over manage-
ment of the process. 
For another example, Jerry Mashaw related in his series on the 
history of administrative law35 that Congress in 1794 appropriated 
money for those who fled a Saint Domingo insurrection “in such man-
ner, and by the hands of such persons, as shall, in the opinion of the  
27. Id.  
28. James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the 
History of Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 Vet. L. Rev. 
135, 145 (2011). 
29. 3 Stat. 410 (1818). 
30. Id. 
31. See A.F. Sisson, History of Veterans’ Pensions and Related 
Benefits 12 (1946).  
32. For the controversies spawned in implementing the program, see John 
Resch, Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, 
Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic 
119–45 (1999) (detailing the scandals that arose when applications 
increased under the 1818 Act). 
33. United States ex rel. Burnett v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64, 68 (1883). 
34. At times, members of Congress represented claimants, a practice that 
illustrates the lack of formality. See Leonard D. White, The Jackson-
ians: A Study in Administrative History 1829–1861, at 417–18 (1954). 
35. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 Yale L.J. 1256 (2006). 
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President, appear most conducive to the humane purposes of this act.”36 
Moreover, after the Whiskey Rebellion, Congress assigned the executive 
the authority to appoint a “board of inquest” to assess damages from 
the rebellion and grant compensation “to aid such of the said sufferers 
as, in his opinion, stand in need of immediate assistance.”37 Congress 
provided the executive no details of the mechanism to use in making 
the compensation determinations. 
These examples suggest that Presidents have long exercised 
substantial control in shaping the claims resolution processes set into 
motion by Congress. Presidents directed clerks and others to resolve 
claims, and affected individuals had no recourse to the courts. In the 
absence of any congressional specification, Presidents enjoyed authority 
under Article II to oversee the adjudication. Individuals enjoyed no Due 
Process rights to an independent judicial officer insulated from 
presidential supervision.38 Congress, for the first 150 years of our 
history, seldom delimited the President’s discretion in deciding claims 
left to his resolution. 
III. Presidential Control Through the 
Appointment and Removal Authorities 
In the last seventy-five years, however, Congress more frequently 
has conditioned the way in which the executive branch is to carry out 
delegated adjudicative tasks. The question, then, is how to accom-
modate such congressional direction with the Article II interest in 
superintending all delegated authority. 
The appointment and removal authorities represent the formal 
means by which a President influences executive branch policymaking. 
Although party and personal loyalty may, at times, be as effective, 
there is no question but that through both means Presidents can shape 
the policy formulated by subordinates, whether reached through 
rulemaking, enforcement, or adjudication. 
On the one hand, fundamental norms of fairness suggest the wisdom 
of separating adjudication from political control. Given those norms, 
perhaps Congress can insulate adjudication within the executive branch 
more than rulemaking and enforcement. On the other hand, why 
differentiate different types of policymaking within the executive 
branch? Agency officials fashion executive policy whether acting  
36. Id. at 1298 (citing 6 Stat. 13 (1794)). 
37. Id. (citing 4 Annals of Congress 1001–02 (1794) (statements of 
Representatives Gilbert and Boudinot)). 
38. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (upholding delegation of 
workmen’s compensation scheme to agency and rejecting a Due Process 
attack to administrative adjudication of eligibility); Withrow v. Larkin, 
421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975) (upholding against a Due Process attack adjudi-
cation carried out by state medical board that exercised both investigative 
and adjudicative tasks). 
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through rulemaking, enforcement, or adjudication. Accordingly, this 
Article next explores whether the President’s power to appoint and 
remove adjudicatory officials is as plenary as over officials exercising 
regulatory and enforcement authority, before turning in Part IV to the 
question whether the President’s inherent managerial power should be 
as great in the adjudicatory context as it is in the others.  
A. The Appointment Power  
With respect to the appointment power, Presidents select judicial 
officials, whether serving on the bench or in agencies, as well as 
enforcement officials. Presidents gain influence over adjudication 
through the power to determine the identity of the officials exercising 
judicial power. Under Article II, the President must have authority to 
appoint all superior officers such as Article III judges.  
Congress also can vest the appointment of subordinate judicial 
officials in the President but can select as well (with a qualification 
discussed infra)39 the heads of departments or courts of law. Although 
the President currently does not have the power to appoint all lower-
level judicial officials, heads of departments typically appoint such 
judicial officials, and thus control remains with the executive branch. 
In Ryder v. United States,40 for instance, the Court invalidated 
appointment of civilians on the Coast Guard Court of Military Review 
on the ground that the appointment circumvented Article II and 
thereby divested the President of sufficient say in elaboration of 
adjudicative policy.41 More recently, the D.C. Circuit struck down the 
Librarian of Congress’s appointment of members of the Copyright 
Royalty Board because the Board members, as principal officers exer-
cising judicial functions, could only be appointed by the President.42 
In contrast, in Edmond v. United States,43 the Court upheld the 
Secretary of Transportation’s appointment of judges on the Coast 
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals on the ground that they were inferior 
officers,44 and the Court in Freytag v. Commissioner45 did the same 
with respect to Tax Court special trial judges.46 The extent of judicial 
 
39. Congress might vest appointment of inferior judicial officers in the courts 
of law. See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
40. 515 U.S. 177 (1995). 
41. Id. at 182–84.  
42. Intercollegiate Broadcasting System v. Copyright Royalty Board, 684 
F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The court’s cure was to convert the Board 
members to inferior officers. 
43. 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
44. Id. at 660–61.  
45. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
46. Id. at 873.  
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duties and degree of authority exercised determine whether the judicial 
officials are superior or inferior officers.47 
The appointment power provides Presidents with the ability to 
choose individuals whom they trust to carry out law enforcement, rule-
making and adjudication. By itself, however, the appointment power 
provides Presidents with limited control given that officials and judges 
may veer from the policy preferences of a President. The first President 
Bush’s appointment of David Souter to the Supreme Court resulted in 
a liberal voting pattern and thus provides an illustration of the 
imperfect control of the appointment power.48 Nonetheless, the 
appointment power is a key facet of the presidential power to carry into 
effect the laws set in motion by Congress. 
Congress cannot choose the officials to preside over adjudications, 
other than to determine in the case of an inferior officer whether the 
President or some other entity outside Congress is to appoint the 
official. If the judicial officer does not rise to the level of an inferior 
officer, then Congress need not place the appointment in the hands of 
the President, head of a department, or the courts of law. For instance, 
in Landry v. FDIC,49 the D.C. Circuit determined that an FDIC ALJ 
was not an inferior officer but merely an employee, principally because 
the ALJ had no formal decisionmaking authority but merely 
recommended decisions to the agency for resolution.50 The ALJ’s 
factfinding authority by itself was insufficient to meet the “significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” test51 to determine 
officer status. Even though the FDIC often deferred to ALJ factfinding, 
de facto authority could not be equated with “officer” status. And, in 
Tucker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,52 the same court held 
that settlement officers at the IRS Office of Appeals were not inferior 
officers, principally because their discretion was highly constrained.53 
Employees typically are covered by the Civil Service laws and shielded 
from at-will dismissal. In any event, Congress presumably can take no 
 
47. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662. 
48. See Ed Lazarus, Four Enduring Myths About Supreme Court Nominees, 
Time (May 26, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/ 
article/0,28804,1900851_1900850_1900845,00.html. 
49. 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
50. Id. at 1134. Similarly, in Tucker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012), the D.C. Circuit held that Tax Court 
appeals officers are employees within the meaning of Article II because 
their discretion was highly constrained and subject to supervision. Id. at 
1134. 
51. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
52. 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
53. Id. at 1133. 
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direct role in the selection of employees who work within the executive 
branch. 
The Court has recognized a limited exception to presidential power 
over appointments. In Morrison v. Olson,54 the Court upheld an 
unusual interbranch appointment of an executive branch official.55 
Under the Ethics in Government Act,56 Congress vested in a special 
division of the D.C. Circuit the power to appoint an independent 
counsel, whom the Court deemed to be an inferior officer within the 
executive branch. Although the appointment robbed the President of 
his customary power to determine the identity of officials administering 
the law, the Court upheld the interbranch appointment, reasoning that 
the Appointments Clause included no explicit prohibition on 
interbranch appointments given that Congress under Article II can vest 
the appointment of an inferior officer “in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”57 The Court 
acknowledged that such appointment could violate the separation of 
powers if it deprived one branch of its power to fulfill its constitutional 
obligations and “would be improper if there was some ‘incongruity’ 
between the functions normally performed by the courts and the 
performance of their duty to appoint.”58 Thus, it is likely that courts 
would find appointment by the courts of law of judicial officials in the 
executive branch more “congruous” than appointment by the courts of 
law of enforcement officials. One can imagine, for instance, a role for 
Article III judges in appointment of judicial officials working on Article 
I tribunals such as the Court of Federal Claims or the Tax Court.59 Or, 
Congress could empower Article III judges to appoint ALJs. To that 
limited extent, therefore, Presidents have less power to appoint judicial 
officials than others within the executive branch.  
B. The Removal Authority 
Presidents have argued, and courts have agreed,60 that the 
President’s removal authority is largely derivative of the power to 
appoint. Although not explicit, Article II vests in the President the 
 
54. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
55. Id. at 696–97.  
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–98 (1994) (no longer in effect due to nonrenewal). 
57. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
58. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676; see also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 
(1880) (upholding judicial appointment of election supervisors vested with 
some enforcement responsibility). 
59. For a proposal that Article III judges appoint ALJs, see Kent Barnett, 
Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 797 (2013). 
60. See e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–71 (determining the removal of an 
officer under the appointment power).  
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power to remove from office principal (and, at times, inferior) officers 
exercising law administration and rulemaking authority, such as for 
heads of administrative agencies. At times, the President’s removal 
authority is plenary, but the Court has also recognized that Congress 
can limit the President’s control over principal officers when not 
incompatible with his ability to manage the executive branch.61 
Although Congress can shut down an agency, it can take no direct role 
in removing any official from office other than through impeachment.62 
The removal authority provides Presidents with a formal way to 
ensure that subordinate officials toe the line in exercising duties 
delegated by Congress, creating a type of “‘here-and-now subserv-
ience.’”63 At the same time, the removal authority links acts of subor-
dinates to the President in the public eye. 
As applied to judicial officials, the removal power ensures that the 
President can discharge officials at least for “cause.” Even though the 
parameters of cause have not been fleshed out by the Court, it would 
plainly empower the President to remove officials who abuse the public 
trust. If an Article I judge on the Tax Court were rude to litigants, the 
President could remove the judge from office. The President could also 
remove judicial officials who neglected their duties or engaged in 
improprieties off the bench.  
In Kuretski v. Commissioner,64 taxpayers sought to invalidate tax 
assessments on the ground that the President’s power to remove an IRS 
Commissioner for cause violated the separation of powers.65 They 
argued that the potential for removal meant that Article I judges would 
be too deferential to the President’s interests and thereby counter 
Congress’s design of an independent Tax Court. The D.C. Circuit 
rebuffed the challenge, reiterating that “Congress may afford the 
[judicial] officers . . . a measure of independence from other executive 
actors, but they remain Executive-Branch officers subject to 
presidential removal.”66 Setting aside what constitutes “cause,” the 
removal authority remains a principal means by which Presidents 
superintend the authority delegated from Congress. 
 
61. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675–77. Congress has the power to create 
independent agencies within the executive branch, which typically refers 
to the fact that Congress can shield the head of such agencies from plenary 
removal. See id. at 687. 
62. See e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (“Congress cannot reserve 
for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of 
the laws except by impeachment.”). 
63. Id. at 727 n.5 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1392 
(D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
64. 755 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
65. Id. at 932. 
66. Id. at 944. 
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With respect to the removal power, the Court has suggested that 
Presidents have less authority over judicial officials as opposed to others 
within the executive branch. Most notably, the Court first suggested 
limits to executive control over adjudication in Humphrey’s Executor 
v. United States.67 There, the Court considered whether the President 
enjoyed the plenary right of removal over the head of the Federal Trade 
Commission, even though Congress had specified that the 
Commissioner could only be removed for cause. The Court disting-
uished Myers v. United States,68 which had upheld the President’s 
inherent right to remove an officer of the United States for any reason 
at all,69 on the ground that the FTC Commissioner exercised both 
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power.70 Of relevance here, the Court 
stated that the 
Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by 
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the 
statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein 
prescribed . . . or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any 
proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the 
executive.71  
The Court further elaborated that “[u]nder § 7, which authorizes the 
commission to act as a master in chancery under rules prescribed by 
the court, it acts as an agency of the judiciary.”72 Indeed, the Court 
stated that a rule recognizing an executive plenary removal authority 
over the FTC Commissioner would necessitate recognizing such 
authority over “judges of the legislative Court of Claims, exercising 
judicial power.”73 Given that judicial officials within the executive 
branch routinely resolve cases between claimants and the government, 
removing judges for being too anti-government would prevent the very 
aims of establishing a formal judicial procedure. Presidents should be 
able to remove such officers for cause, but not for accumulating a 
claimant-friendly record.  
The Supreme Court maintained the Humphrey’s Executor differ-
entiation in Wiener v. United States.74 The Court held that the Pres-
ident did not enjoy plenary removal authority over a War Claims 
 
67. 295 U.S. 602, 604 (1935). 
68. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
69. Id. at 176.  
70. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 627–28.  
71. Id. at 628. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 629. 
74. 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958). 
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Commissioner even when the statute establishing the office did not, as 
in Humphrey’s Executor, attempt to limit the President’s removal 
authority. The Court explained that “[w]hen Congress has for distri-
bution among American claimants funds derived from foreign sources, 
it may proceed in different ways. Congress may appropriate directly; it 
may utilize the Executive; it may resort to the adjudicatory process.”75 
Moreover, the “fact that it chose to establish a Commission to 
‘adjudicate according to law’ the classes of claims defined in the statute 
did not alter the intrinsic judicial character of the task.”76 Finally, “[i]f, 
as one must take for granted, the War Claims Act precluded the 
President from influencing the Commission in passing on a particular 
claim, a fortiori must it be inferred that Congress did not wish to have 
hung over the Commission the Damocles’ sword of removal.”77 The 
President could not, therefore, remove a judicial official within the 
executive branch from office absent cause. The Court would not lightly 
impute to Congress an intent to countenance plenary removal authority 
over judicial officials. The Court signaled that it would more readily 
find in the statutory language a congressional intent to limit the 
President’s removal of judicial as opposed to other executive branch 
officials.  
The Court’s subsequent decision in Morrison v. Olson78 arguably 
has limited the President’s plenary removal authority further than in 
Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener. There, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of Congress’s determination to shield the independent 
counsel under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 from the 
executive’s plenary removal authority.79 Under the Act, the Attorney 
General could remove the independent counsel only for cause. The 
Court acknowledged that “[i]t is undeniable that the Act reduces the 
amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General . . . exer-
cises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged 
criminal activity.”80 The question was not, as in Humphrey’s Executor 
and Wiener, whether the official exercised quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative power. Rather, in light of the congressionally imposed 
limitation on the removal authority, the question was whether the 
Executive retained “sufficient control over the independent counsel to 
ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally 
assigned duties.”81 In Morrison, the Court concluded that in light of the  
75. Id. at 355. 
76. Id.  
77. Id. at 356. 
78. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
79. Id. at 696–97. 
80. Id. at 695. 
81. Id. at 696. 
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limited scope of the independent counsel’s duties and the limited 
duration of the office, the Attorney General’s ability to remove the 
counsel for cause was sufficient to accord with separation of powers 
principles.  
As applied to a judicial official, the formulation in Morrison likely 
would yield the same result as in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener: 
limiting the President or subordinate executive official’s power to 
remove a judicial officer for cause would preserve in the executive 
“sufficient control . . . to ensure that the President is able to perform 
his constitutionally assigned duties.”82 The President would not have 
any direct way to ensure that agency heads wisely fashion policy 
through adjudication, but Morrison suggests that such restrictions are 
permissible for enforcement officials as well. The Court will uphold 
congressionally established for-cause limitations on the removal of 
judicial officials. Thus, Congress can insulate (to a certain degree) 
judicial officials within the executive branch from the President’s con-
trol. 
The Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund 
v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board83 slightly revises the 
constitutional terrain once again, but in a way reaffirming that 
Congress can condition the removal of officials who solely engage in 
adjudication. In the context of an agency (the PCAOB) subject to 
oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Court held 
that two layers of insulation from the President’s removal authority left 
the President with too little constitutional control over the exercise of 
delegated authority. Because of the two layers of insulation, “the 
President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own 
responsibilities.”84  
As with other agencies, the PCAOB exercised a mixture of 
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative duties. But the Court was 
clear that its two-layer rule will not apply to purely adjudicative 
officials such as ALJs.85 Although there are many judicial officials 
within the executive branch whose supervisors are subject to plenary 
removal, Congress in its discretion can limit the removal of judicial 
officials even when the supervisors of such judicial officials can only be 
removed for cause. In other words, Congress can insulate judicial 
officials by inserting two layers of cause protecting them from 
discharge.86  
 
82. Id.  
83. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
84. Id. at 514. 
85. Id. at 507 n.10. 
86. Nonetheless, there has been a recent spate of challenges to SEC adjudi-
cation on the ground that the “for cause” protection for ALJs is incom-
patible with the PCAOB decision. See Peter J. Henning, SEC Faces 
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The Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund expanded the Presi-
dent’s power under Article II with respect to other executive branch 
officials, reflecting an accountability version of Article II authority—
the President must have the tools to ensure superintendence over law 
execution. As the Court stated, “[by] granting the Board executive 
power without the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the 
President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed—as 
well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts.”87 But the 
Court did not hold that the concern for Article II accountability ex-
tended to officials exercising solely adjudicative functions, presumably 
because the public does not “pass judgment” on presidential supervision 
of judging to the same extent as regulation and law enforcement. Thus, 
even after Free Enterprise Fund, Congress can limit the removal of 
adjudicative officials within the executive branch to “cause.”  
In the absence of a for-cause limitation, however, it is not as clear 
whether courts will impute to Congress an intent to shield the official 
from at-will removal as it did in Wiener. For instance, in Kalaris v. 
Donovan,88 decided after Wiener but before Morrison, the Secretary of 
Labor attempted to remove two members of the Benefits Review Board 
without specifying the reasons for removal. The hearing officers argued, 
and the district court agreed, that Congress—as in the War Claims 
Commission context—would not have wished to give the Secretary of 
Labor plenary removal authority over hearing officers exercising the 
“‘quasi-judicial’ function of adjudicating ‘private rights.’”89 Plenary 
removal, from that perspective, was incompatible with judicial 
independence. 
The D.C. Circuit Court disagreed, finding that Congress could well 
have envisioned close managerial control over judicial officials and that, 
in the absence of congressional direction setting forth terms of office, 
Presidents could exercise a plenary removal authority. The court 
acknowledged that the Board was “performing a ‘quasi-judicial’ 
function” but noted that “this general characterization does little to 
distinguish the Board, constitutionally, from the scores of administra-
tive boards and tribunals in the Executive Branch that currently 
adjudicate claims to federal statutory rights.”90 Indeed, the court noted 
“there are suggestions in the history of the Act and its subsequent 
administration that Congress affirmatively intended for Board 
members, as part of the Department of Labor’s staff, to serve as other 
 
Challenges Over the Constitutionality of Some of Its Court Proceedings, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2015. 
87. Id. at 498.  
88. 697 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
89. Id. at 393. 
90. Id. at 400. 
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appointed officials serve—at the discretion of the Secretary.”91 Viewed 
another way, individuals enjoy no Due Process right to an adjudicator 
insulated from plenary removal, even when the entity possessing the 
limited removal authority has an interest in the results of the 
adjudication. Congress can limit the removal authority over judicial 
officials within the executive branch; moreover, in the absence of any 
specific congressional restriction, courts must divine from the context 
whether an intent to shield the official should be imputed to Congress. 
Affording Congress more leeway to insulate adjudicative, as 
opposed to regulatory and enforcement, officials conforms to intuition. 
If Congress wishes to shield judicial officials from presidential appoint-
ment, it likely can do so except in the case of principal officers, and if 
Congress wishes to condition the executive’s power to remove all such 
officials within the executive branch, it would likely be successful as 
well. Such limitations would accord with the rule in Morrison v. Olson 
that all such arrangements must leave the executive branch with 
control over the essential attributes of the executive power.  
As a consequence, the President’s authority over the policymaking 
arising from adjudication need not be as complete as over policymaking 
by regulators or enforcement officials. In the Court’s view, the process 
by which policymaking is reached makes a difference—judicial-type 
process can be shielded from executive control more completely than 
when other means of fashioning policy are provided, even though the 
policy emerging from both may be similar.92 Perhaps in the public eye, 
there is less reason to link adjudication to presidential authority than 
to forge a link between officials who make and enforce rules. 
Humphrey’s Executor, Wiener, Free Enterprise Fund, and the like all 
acknowledged the distinctive case for insulating adjudicative officials 
from close presidential control, even though the Court itself has 
recognized that adjudicators shape policy while engaging in 
factfinding.93  
 
91. Id. at 390. 
92. Congress, of course, can choose to resolve claims on its own. Although 
Justice Powell sought to gird invalidation of the one-house veto in INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring), on Due Process 
grounds, his colleagues on the Court did not follow his lead. And, there is 
no judicial review possible when Congress denies a petition for a stay of 
deportation or for a monetary claim. The Supreme Court has held that it 
is for Congress to determine the structure and fairness of adjudication of 
public rights, whether in Congress or the executive branch. And 
Congress’s control over adjudication is plenary if it chooses not to delegate 
tasks to the executive branch, assuming that no Due Process issue arises. 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 67–85; see also Adrian Vermeule, 
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163, 1211–
14 (2013) (similarly charting the change in the Court’s jurisprudence). 
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IV. Managerial Authority Over Adjudicative 
Officials In The Executive Branch 
Although others have noted that the President’s appointment and 
removal authority over adjudicative officials within the executive 
branch need not be as firm as over other officials,94 they have not 
explored the corollary: In addition to the formal controls of appoint-
ment and removal is the President’s more intangible managerial 
oversight over judicial officials also weaker?95 Accordingly, this section 
first explores the President’s general managerial authority under Article 
II and then concludes that Congress more readily can block executive 
branch managerial efforts over judicial than over regulatory and 
enforcement officials. 
A. Presidential Managerial Controls 
Congressional delegation to specific executive branch officials has 
not precluded Presidents from exercising managerial oversight in 
addition to the controls of appointment and removal. Without such 
oversight, there would be little coordination among agencies, resulting 
in duplication and waste.96 Article II, in other words, has been read to 
vest in the President power to take steps to manage the authority 
delegated by Congress to the executive branch. Presidents have 
established task forces cutting across agencies to permit joint efforts in 
combatting poverty or illegal immigration. They have created platforms 
to facilitate cross-agency discussion of issues of common concern and 
have also set up mechanisms to resolve disputes among agencies.97 In 
National Mining Association v. McCarthy,98 the D.C. Circuit recently 
stated that “[u]nder Article II of the Constitution, departments and 
agencies in the Executive Branch are subordinate to one President and 
may consult and coordinate to implement the laws passed by 
 
94. E.g., Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence after PCAOB, 32 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 2391, 2391–93 (2011); Vermeule, supra note 93; Barnett, supra 
note 59. 
95. These controls undoubtedly have increased over time. Congress in the 
early years at times delegated authority to subordinate officials with such 
specificity that little oversight was contemplated. See Frank J. 
Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of the 
United States 136–37 (1905).  
96. Cf. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1196–1209 (2012) (arguing 
that the executive branch should help coordinate agencies to solve chal-
lenges such as overlapping and fragmented delegations). 
97. For the role of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, 
see Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979). 
98. 758 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
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Congress.”99 Indeed, the court continued that “[i]n a ‘single Executive 
Branch headed by one President,’ we do not lightly impose a rule ‘that 
would deter one executive agency from consulting another about 
matters of shared concern.’”100 
Moreover, Presidents have asserted greater managerial authority 
by requiring, in executive orders and less formal directives, that 
agencies follow particular policies, whether on contracting out goods 
and services101 or banning smoking in the workplace.102 These directives 
can fashion significant policy that could not otherwise be pursued. For 
several notable examples, President Truman used executive orders to 
spark the government’s fight against segregation by ordering that the 
military be desegregated.103 The second President Bush created the 
Department of Homeland Security.104 President Obama outlawed dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the federal workforce.105 
Indeed, President Obama’s recent initiative to defer deportation of 
certain categories of illegal immigrants stemmed from a presidential 
memo, not even an official executive order.106 Although the 
appointment and removal authorities should not be ignored, Presidents 
manage the executive branch routinely through other means. In the 
absence of congressional direction to the contrary, Presidents can 
fashion policy to guide the way in which the executive branch fulfills 
the mission set by Congress.107 
 
99. Id. at 249. 
100. Id. (quoting Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos 
Varios v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 638 F.3d 794, 803 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).  
101. Memorandum from Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the 
President to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Establishments (May 29, 
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
assets/omb/circulars/a076/a76_incl_tech_correction.pdf. 
102. Exec. Order No. 13,058, 41 C.F.R. § 74.315 (2013). 
103. Exec. Order No. 9,981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1949).  
104. Editorial, Mr. Ridge Goes to Washington, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2001, at 
A16. 
105. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014). 
106. See Conn Carroll, It Is Completely Irrelevant That President Obama 
Never Signed an Executive Order on Immigration, Townhall.com (Dec. 
11, 2014), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/conncarroll/2014/12/11/it-is-
completely-irrelevant-that-obama-never-signed-an-executive-order-on-
immigration-n1930571. 
107. For an example of an executive order struck down because of a conflict 
with congressional policy, see Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 
1322, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1996). For an example of an executive order struck 
down for lack of presidential authority, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952). 
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With administrative rulemaking as well, Presidents have exerted 
control over rulemaking by requiring agencies to comply with Executive 
Orders charting particular procedural steps before the agencies can 
announce certain major rules. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and 
Reagan attempted to ensure that agencies engaged in ever more 
stringent cost-benefit analysis before releasing rules.108 Although the 
particular politics at stake was controversial, the constitutional basis 
for such executive orders was not. As the D.C. Circuit explained, “[T]he 
President’s power necessarily encompasses ‘general administrative 
control of those executing the laws’ throughout the Executive Branch 
of government. . . . His faithful execution of the laws enacted by the 
Congress . . . frequently requires the President to provide guidance and 
supervision to his subordinates.”109 Thus, even when Congress delegates 
rulemaking or a quasi-legislative role to agencies, the President has a 
critical role to play in superintending the rulemaking.110 
The extent of the President’s bureaucratic controls over adjudi-
cative officials is not as clear. Given that Congress may leave the 
President less appointment and removal authority over judicial officers 
than others within the executive branch, the President’s general 
managerial authority over judicial officials arguably can be similarly 
circumscribed. Indeed, in Myers v. United States the Court stated that 
“there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive 
officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after 
hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the 
President cannot in a particular case properly influence or control.”111 
The President may not direct the conduct of subordinate judicial 
officials to the same extent as in rulemaking and enforcement. Should 
judicial officials, therefore, whether appointed by the President, heads 
of departments, or courts of law, report up the chain of command just 
 
108. President Ford through Executive Order No. 11,821 required all agencies 
to prepare Economic Impact Statements to submit to the Council on 
Wage and Price Stability. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1975). 
President Carter sought to increase public participation in rulemaking 
through Executive Order No. 12,044. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 
152 (1978). Under Executive Order No. 12,291 and then 12,498, President 
Reagan provided for centralized controls over all major agency 
rulemakings. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); Exec. Order 
No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986). Under the orders, each agency had to 
ensure that the delineated benefits in all rules exceeded theirs costs. 
Agencies prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis and submitted proposed 
rules to OMB for its independent study and comment prior to publication. 
Presidents since have continued centralization of rulemaking. 
109. Building & Construction Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 
28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). 
110. For an argument that presidential supervision over enforcement has been 
surprisingly less comprehensive, see Kate Andrias, The President’s 
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031 (2013). 
111. Id. at 135.  
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like most enforcement and regulatory officials? Alternatively, should 
they be able to disregard directives if those directives interfere with 
their exercise of judicial functions prescribed by Congress?  
In the absence of specification from Congress, Presidents should be 
able to manage judicial officers in the executive branch to the same 
extent as those exercising regulatory and enforcement functions. In 
addition to the power to appoint and remove from office, Presidents 
can issue directives on what steps to take and what issues to consider 
in resolving claims. In customs cases, for example, the executive branch 
should be able to create procedures to govern the claims and even 
clarify presumptions as to what amounts are due. At some point, 
presidential meddling might violate the Due Process Clause if an 
entitlement exists, but short of that possibility, Presidents can 
structure the adjudications that Congress entrusts to them as they see 
fit. Indeed, the history of pension and other claims resolved by the 
executive branch within our nation’s first century of existence amply 
demonstrates the discretion enjoyed by the President, absent Con-
gress’s direction to the contrary. It is as if Congress directed the Pres-
ident personally to resolve the claims. 
On the other hand, Congress routinely creates specific agencies to 
adjudicate particular claims. The President presumably cannot switch 
the NLRB’s adjudications to the Department of Labor. Congress can 
also designate the particular officer, whether an ALJ or hearing 
examiner, to resolve particular claims. Congress has determined whe-
ther particular claims can be subject to judicial review, and it has 
directed when alternative dispute resolution as opposed to adjudication 
should be utilized.112 
At some point, congressional limitation of presidential authority 
over adjudication within the executive branch violates the separation 
of powers doctrine. As discussed before, Congress must leave sufficient 
appointment and removal authority to allow the President some influ-
ence over the shape of the policymaking delegated to the executive 
branch. One price of vesting judicial authority within executive control 
is that the President cannot be divested of complete oversight. Congress 
cannot replicate the Article III protection of tenure for judicial officers 
in the NLRB or SEC. If Congress delegates sufficient authority to a 
judicial official, that official can only be appointed in conformance with 
the procedures in Article II.  
 
112. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (2012); 39 U.S.C. § 1207 (2012). See generally U.S. 
Office of Personnel Mgmt, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Handbook (explaining alternative dispute resolution and discussing 
federal agency use of alternative dispute resolution to resolve workplace 
disputes), available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/emp 
loyee-relations/employee-rights-appeals/alternative-dispute-resolution/ 
handbook.pdf. 
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Congress presumably could insulate agency officials who only 
engage in factfinding more completely than for those who also have a 
policy role. When adjudication essentially only includes factfinding, 
there is commensurately less executive power at stake.113 Adjudication 
of facts resembles more of a routinized function although, as discussed 
previously, inferences in factfinding can shape the ultimate resolution 
of the case. Even in such adjudicatory contexts, therefore, an executive 
interest remains to ensure that the factfinding proceed in a way 
consistent with the executive’s view of how best to implement the 
congressional command, but Congress can leave less discretion in the 
President’s hands than in the regulatory and enforcement contexts. 
B. Accommodating Congressional Design of Administrative 
Adjudication with Executive Managerial Control 
Few conflicts have been triggered by congressional efforts to shield 
judicial officials in the executive branch from presidential management 
efforts. Congress often has provided scant details when delegating 
adjudicative authority to the executive branch. Thus, courts have not 
had occasion to chart the boundaries between the executive’s interest 
in superintending all policymakers and a congressional interest in 
preventing executive meddling. 
In this section, I first consider a recent example arising from a 
Veterans Administration controversy in which Congress sought to 
direct in detail how particular claims are to be adjudicated by the 
executive branch. I then examine the extent to which Congress through 
the APA more generally has sought to curb Article II managerial 
authority over adjudicative officials in the executive branch. The APA 
represents the principal means by which Congress has shaped 
adjudication within the executive branch. The APA does not address a 
myriad of details from scheduling status conferences to setting deadlines 
for decisions, leaving the executive branch a large measure of 
managerial authority. I conclude, however, that the APA’s grant of 
decisional independence to ALJs, at a minimum, precludes the 
executive branch from influencing the decisions before the fact and from 
disciplining adjudicative officials for the substance of their decisions, no 
matter how poorly reasoned.  
1. Veterans Access Act 
In reviewing alarming reports of the delays and errors in processing 
veterans’ claims at the Veterans Administration,114 Congress this past 
 
113. Cf. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 539 (1838) (holding 
that injunction against executive branch officer can lie to require 
performance of “ministerial” duties).  
114. See Veterans Admin. Office of Inspector Gen., Veterans Health 
Admin. Interim Report: Review of Patient Wait Times, 
Scheduling Practices, and Alleged Patient Deaths at the 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
Presidential Control of Adjudication Within the Executive Branch 
1106 
year evidently became concerned that the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (“MSPB”), the agency previously delegated the authority to 
review challenges to discipline, meted to certain high-level government 
employees, would treat too lightly those responsible for the problems 
plaguing the Veterans Administration. Accordingly, it somewhat 
bizarrely altered the review process for Senior Executive Service 
(“SES”) employees within the agency subject to discipline by 
(1) requiring an Administrative Judge in the MSPB to hear any appeal 
within twenty-one days or otherwise sustain the discipline; and 
(2) precluding review by the MSPB as a whole.115 No review is provided 
beyond the administrative level. Administrative Judges perform 
comparable functions to the more familiar ALJs but outside the 
protections of the APA.116 
The new law thus changed administrative practice in two fun-
damental ways. First, Congress forced strict timelines on the agency, 
requiring it to place any challenges from SES employees at the head of 
the line. Given the general delay in processing challenges, the twenty-
one-day limit is unprecedented. The MSPB will have to prioritize the 
SES cases if it is to provide a forum at all. Indeed, it must adopt an e-
filing system to permit such adjudication to go forward.117 Moreover, 
the sanction is extraordinary—if the MSPB cannot hold the hearing 
and decide on the merits immediately, the Veterans Administration 
discipline will stand, depriving the employees of the opportunity to tell 
their side of the story before a neutral arbiter.Second, the legislation 
deprives the MSPB of policy oversight for the discipline. Congress, after 
all, previously delegated to the agency the policy role of determining 
when employee discipline should stand, not the Administrative Judges. 
Congress seemingly bypassed the Presidential appointees in delegating 
the unreviewed and unchecked adjudication to Administrative Judges 
who, given the Landry precedent, likely should not be considered 
officers of the United States subject to the Appointments Clause.  
The MSPB itself questioned the constitutionality of Congress’s 
action in a letter to the President.118 The MSPB stated in part that  
 
Phoenix Health Care System (May 28, 2014), available at www.va. 
gov.oig/VAIOG-14-02603-178pdf. 
115. Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 
113-146, § 707, 128 Stat. 1754, 1798–99 (Aug. 7, 2014). 
116. 5 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012). 
117. Letter from Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman, U.S. Merit Systems 
Protection Board, to House and Senate Committees on Veterans’ Affairs 
(Aug. 21, 2014), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs. 
aspx?docnumber=1075012&version=1079327&application=ACROBAT. 
118. Letter from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board to President Barack 
Obama (Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.mspb.gov/net 
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[w]e believe that Section 707 which, as noted above, prohibits 
presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed officers of the execu-
tive branch from performing the responsibilities for which those 
officers were appointed and confirmed to carry out, is on weak 
constitutional footing. . . . Moreover, various courts have sug-
gested that Congress is not permitted to infringe on the right of 
the executive branch to enforce the laws . . . .119  
The letter warned of a precedent under which Congress could “under-
mine—through must-pass legislation . . . —the ability of presidentially-
appointed, Article II Officers of the United States to carry out the 
mission of the agency to which they were appointed to lead.”120 
Yet the new Act is consistent with Congress’s ability to curb agency 
management efforts. The twenty-one-day directive, even though it 
forces the executive agency to reprioritize cases for decision and create 
a new e-filing system, should pass constitutional muster.121 Congress 
can design an adjudicative process for executive agencies to follow 
without violating Article II, even when creating burdens on federal 
agencies and making it more difficult for the President to oversee the 
adjudicative process.  
Moreover, the MSPB’s argument that Congress impermissibly has 
circumvented Article II authority is no more compelling. The MSPB 
need not be accorded a role in overseeing all discipline cases. The 
desideratum of coordination is a policy call for Congress, not the 
agency.122 To be sure, the Act vests the Administrative Judges as 
opposed to the MSPB with final decisionmaking authority in the SES 
cases, so that the Administrative Judges might now be considered 
inferior officers. But, given that the Administrative Judges were 
appointed by the MSPB members who are superior officers, no Ap-
pointments Clause issue should arise. Despite the MSPB letter, there is 
no Article II infirmity in bypassing the MSPB for this select group of 
claimants.  
 
search/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1068653&version=1072950&applicati
on=ACROBAT. 
119. Id. 
120. Id.  
121. For the first MSPB decision complying with the new congressional 
directive, see Talton v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. At-0707-0094-J-1 
(Nov. 19, 2014) (sustaining VA discipline). 
122. As long as Congress’s intent is clearly articulated, which it was in this 
instance. See supra text accompanying notes 100. 
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Nonetheless, the Due Process issues at stake are substantial. The 
SES employees presumably enjoy a Due Process right in their continu-
ing employment.123 The new statute affords a more prompt hearing after 
the discipline is meted but, if the twenty-one-day limit so curtails the 
type of hearing that the MSPB can afford, a Due Process challenge may 
be appropriate.124 And if the MSPB cannot comply with the twenty-
one-day rule, then the discipline stands. The lack of opportunity to 
contest the discipline in that situation cannot be squared with Due 
Process principles. 
2. The APA 
Congress has provided that much adjudication in the executive 
branch be subject to the APA’s constraints.125 Congress through the 
APA has determined that agency hearings are to be conducted before 
an administrative judiciary that is protected to some extent from 
agency interference. For instance, agencies that employ ALJs cannot 
hire or fire them, except for cause, and that “cause” is to be determined 
by a separate agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board as in the 
Veterans Access Act context.126 Nor do the agencies set pay for ALJs, 
and agencies cannot dock ALJs’ pay.127 Agencies cannot subject ALJs 
to performance evaluations, for similar reasons.128 In addition, ex parte 
discussions with outsiders are limited in order to prevent even the 
 
123. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (providing 
that government employment can be an entitlement subject to Due 
Process protection). 
124. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (delineating 
balancing test to use to determine if sufficient process is afforded). 
125. 5 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); see also Office of the Chairman of the Admin. 
Conference of the U.S., Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission: Evaluating the Status and Placement of Adjudi-
cations in the Federal Sector Hearing Program 4–8 (Mar. 31, 
2014), available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
FINAL%20EEOC%20Final%20Report%20%5B3-31-14%5D.pdf (provid-
ing on overview of the APA’s requirements for adjudication). 
126. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012). 
127. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012). Although Congress can reduce pay for ALJs as a 
group or eliminate their jobs altogether, Congress cannot readily pressure 
any individual ALJ to reach a particular decision. The issues raised in 
such hearings, in any event, are unlikely to be of such salience as to attract 
the attention of members of Congress. 
128. 5 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012). 
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appearance of impropriety.129 As the Supreme Court described in Butz 
v. Economou,130  
[T]he process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as 
to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent 
judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the 
parties or other officials within the agency. Prior to the Admini-
strative Procedure Act, there was considerable concern that per-
sons hearing administrative cases at the trial level could not exer-
cise independent judgment because . . . they were often subord-
inate to executive officials within the agency.131 
With respect to ALJ decisions under the APA, agency heads need 
not pay any deference to the factfinding and legal pronouncements of 
ALJs. In fact, the only check on agency displacement of ALJ factfinding 
is that the ALJ’s factfinding remains in the record subject to judicial 
review.132 With respect to managerial controls, the APA is silent, but 
Congress provided that agencies may discipline ALJs for “good cause 
established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board” 
after a formal hearing.133 Discipline can stem from conduct in the 
hallways of the agencies,134 at home,135 or from general 
insubordination.136 Although the APA protections are far from com-
plete, the Court’s construction of the appointment and removal author-
ities provides reason to protect any legislative specification of 
independence. Congressional measures to shield adjudicative authority 
from executive branch meddling should be interpreted broadly where 
possible without fear of stepping on executive toes. 
There currently is debate over whether ALJs under the APA should 
be considered employees, as resolved in Landry, or rather inferior 
 
129. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2012); see also Portland 
Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (applying APA ban to other executive branch officials).  
130. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
131. Id. at 513–14. For a discussion of what is meant by decisional indepen-
dence, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: 
Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 434–36 
(2007). 
132. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (explaining 
that Congress has allowed reviewing courts to set aside findings of fact 
when there is insufficient evidence). 
133. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012). 
134. E.g., SSA v. Carter, 35 M.S.P.R. 466, 469 (1985) (sexual harassment). 
135. E.g., Long v. SSA, 635 F.3d 526, 537 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (alleged domestic 
abuse). 
136. E.g., Abrams v. SSA, 703 F.3d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (failure to follow 
case processing order); SSA v. Manion, 19 M.S.P.R. 298, 299 (1984) 
(refusal to hear cases). 
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officers subject to the Appointments Clause. And, the status of ALJs 
might turn on whether, by law, their decisions can fashion policy along 
the typical common law path as opposed to just resolving whatever 
factual issues are at stake. Congress has greater ability to insulate 
employees as opposed to inferior officers from managerial oversight 
given that they are not exercising significant influence over the 
execution of the laws. Irrespective of the resolution of the open issue, 
congressional direction that ALJs be independent does not violate the 
President’s Article II authority. 
Few court cases have arisen demarcating the line between the quasi-
independence guaranteed by Congress and the agency’s managerial 
efforts, but the importance of the line drawing can be seen in ALJs’ 
conflicts with the executive branch’s managerial initiatives, particularly 
at the Social Security Administration (SSA). Several examples 
illustrate the tension.  
First, in response to evidence that ALJs were handling vastly 
different workloads, the Social Security Administration instituted a 
variety of reforms in the 1970s, including prohibiting ALJs from writing 
their own opinions. SSA attempted to attain greater consistency among 
ALJs hearing disability disputes. Some ALJs decided as many as 120 
cases per month while others decided as few as ten.137 Setting a goal to 
resolve a certain number of cases per month does, in a sense, interfere 
with decisionmaking independence. ALJs cannot spend the time they 
deem appropriate on any given case. Indeed, in SSA v. Goodman,138 the 
Merit Systems Protection Board blocked an SSA effort to remove an 
ALJ whose productivity, measured by the number of cases tried, lagged 
behind the national median.139 Although the SSA had for years 
encouraged and then warned the ALJ to increase productivity, the 
MSPB was unmoved.140  
In contrast, in Nash v. Bowen,141 an ALJ challenged a production 
goal as antithetical to the ideal of decisionmaking independence.142 The 
court of appeals, however, rejected the claim, reasoning that a 
production goal “is not a prescription of how . . . an ALJ should decide 
 
137. Jerry L. Mashaw et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals 
120–21 (1991). 
138. 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984).  
139. Id. at 330–31. 
140. I have explored this tension before. Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall, 
Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with Institutional 
Interests of the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. 
Judges 1, 35–38 (2005). 
141. 869 F.2d 675 (1989).  
142. Id. at 676.  
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a particular case.”143 Assuredly, an ALJ might argue that a directive to 
decide more cases bleeds into the merits. For example, SSA ALJs might 
spend less time writing decisions when granting claims against the 
government because the agency has no right to appeal such grants, and 
thus decisions granting benefits will not be scrutinized as much as those 
denying benefits. In order to meet a production goal, therefore, the ALJ 
might be tempted to favor claimants in a close case.144 But in the 
absence of any such connection between the number of cases decided 
and the merits of the case, a production goal does not seem problematic. 
The tension has escalated in recent years as SSA has increased the 
target number of cases that ALJs are to resolve each year to close to 
six hundred. ALJs may feel beleaguered, and they do,145 but the 
question remains whether Congress, in applying the APA to the ALJs, 
would have wished ALJs to be free from such monitoring. Presumably 
not. The connection between workload and decisional independence is 
tenuous,146 and federal courts have workload goals of their own.147 
Had SSA announced, instead, a measure to decrease the national 
grant rate for disability claims, that measure would violate Congress’s 
specification in the APA that ALJs be independent. A historical 
example brings home the point. In response to Congress’s concern over 
proliferation of Social Security disability claims in the late 1970s, SSA 
announced in 1980 that its Appeals Council would review the decisions 
of ALJs whose allowance rates of claims were significantly higher than 
a national random sample, but not those that were lower. In addition, 
the Council stated that it would focus on cases arising from hearing 
offices that had high collective approval rates. The agency provided two 
reasons for targeting ALJs whose allowance rates exceeded the national 
median as opposed to those with allowance rates below the median. 
First, given that claimants, not the agency, appeal adverse 
determinations by the ALJs, review by the Appeals Council would 
restore some balance to the process, ensuring that the agency did not  
143. Id. at 680–81.  
144. See Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Achieving Greater Con-
sistency in Social Security Disability Adjudication: An Empir-
ical Study and Suggested Reforms, ACUS Report 31 (2013), avail-
able at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Achiev 
ing_Greater_Consistency_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf (noting 
that ALJs under pressure “may have allowed more cases because allow-
ances are easier to process than denials”). 
145. Id. at 33 (discussing the effects of agency pressure on ALJs). 
146. See, e.g., Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Colvin, No. 14-
1953 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2015) (brushing aside ALJ argument that workload 
undermined independence). 
147. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 85 
(1970) (addressing informal federal circuit measures addressing judges’ 
backlog of cases). 
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ultimately have to pay more in benefits than Congress had intended. 
Second, the Appeals Council had previously determined that it agreed 
more with ALJs whose allowance rates fell beneath the national median 
than those whose rates exceeded the median. As a result of the own 
motion review, ALJs were put on notice that they would likely be 
subject to review if their allowance rates exceeded the national median. 
Indeed, an SSA memorandum warned that other steps would be taken 
if ALJ allowance rates continued to be much higher than the national 
median. 
Targeting particular ALJs for review unquestionably can compro-
mise decisional independence, and the SSA program likely was enacted 
to that end. Directing all ALJs to adhere closer to the national 
allowance rate resembles a curve familiar in most law school examina-
tions. If Congress had determined that each ALJ was to allow a certain 
percentage of claims—not an inconceivable notion148—then SSA’s own 
motion review of wayward ALJs would be entirely consistent with the 
congressional design. SSA oversight would ensure that ALJs not deviate 
from a curve, much like law administrators attempt to rein in faculty. 
Congress, however, directed each claim to be assessed on its merits. 
The idea of a curve originated with the agency, not Congress. The 
agency’s targeting of ALJs with high allowance rates149 cannot readily 
be seen as an effort to promote uniform standards and therefore violated 
the independence Congress prescribed in the APA.150  
Nonetheless, SSA can target ALJs based on other factors without 
violating the independence sought by Congress. It can target judges 
who are outliers in the sense of both granting greater and fewer claims 
than the median judge, and it can suggest, without mandating, 
percentage ranges of grants for particular types of disability claims 
based on national or regional averages.151 There also is nothing in the 
APA preventing agencies from disciplining judges who are behind on 
their dockets. At a minimum, the APA directs that agency manage-
ment efforts cannot interfere directly with ALJs’ ability to reach what-
ever outcome they deem appropriate. 
 
148. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in 
Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 481, 512 (1990). 
149. See Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 
(D.D.C. 1984) (declaring that “unremitting focus on allowance rates” 
violated the purpose of the APA). 
150. See Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722, 726 (E.D. Ark. 1999) 
(refusing to dismiss first amendment claim by ALJ who alleged dismissal 
based on impartial decision making). 
151. See Krent & Morris, supra note 144, at 63–69 (proposing reforms to 
the current framework). 
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Whether the agency can discipline ALJs for misapplying the law 
after the fact is less clear. On the one hand, the executive branch’s 
interest in removing an ALJ who applies the law incorrectly or, worse 
yet, misstates agency policy is clear. Similarly, an agency likely would 
wish to remove an ALJ who used intemperate language in a decision. 
To many, the APA’s provisions protecting ALJs from removal except 
for “cause” with the “cause” subject to review by the MSPB should 
serve as sufficient protection for ALJs. And as mentioned previously, 
the MSPB has disagreed with employer agencies as to the legality of 
discipline in many decisions.152 On the other hand, upholding discipline 
for the contents of a decision allows an agency to pressure ALJs to 
reach particular results. The prospect of discipline might pressure ALJs 
into changing their decisions and thereby undermine the decisional 
independence that Congress intended through the APA. 
Consider the MSPB decision in SSA v. Anyel.153 There, an ALJ 
challenged agency discipline resulting from errors in decisionmaking. 
The MSPB Administrative Law Judge (currently, an administrative 
judge would preside over the case) assigned to hear the challenge ruled 
that permitting discipline for inaccuracies in an opinion would chill 
decisional independence.154 The MSPB reversed, reasoning that the 
APA was “intended to ‘result in a greater assurance of justice at the 
hands of administrative agencies,’” and that aim eclipsed the 
subordinate goal of ensuring decisional independence.155 According to 
the agency, ridding the agency of ALJs who commit errors is more 
important than assuring the public of ALJ independence.  
The goal of assuring public integrity, however noble, allows too 
much rein to agency heads. There is no objective metric with which to 
capture an “error,” whether flowing from statutory construction, 
weighing competing facts, or simply sloppiness. The MSPB decision in 
Anyel skips over the questions of what constitutes an error and what 
magnitude of error compromises the integrity of the judicial process. 
After all, ALJs156 and district court judges157 are reversed at a sub-
stantial clip. The APA’s decision not to permit performance ratings 
 
152. See, e.g., SSA v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 330–31 (1984) (finding in-
sufficient evidence to support the agency’s decision). 
153. 58 M.S.P.R. 261 (1993).  
154. Id. at 267. 
155. Id. at 268 (quoting statement of Sen. Ferguson, APA Legislative History 
at 337).  
156. The remand rate for SSA ALJs, for instance, is close to 50 percent. Krent 
& Morris, supra note 144, at 9. 
157. See, e.g., Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in 
the Eighth Circuit during 2008, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 51, 67–72 tbl.A 
(2009) (providing reversal rate for each district court judge within the 
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strongly suggests that no discipline should be meted even for what the 
agency believes to be repeated errors in decisions.158 Review by the 
agency is available, and the agency can target ALJs for greater review 
as long as that review is fashioned in a way that does not lean to a 
particular result. Any discipline must be exogenous to the ALJ’s 
reasoning in the decision itself. 
Management discipline of immigration judges highlights the danger 
of meddling.159 During the prior administration, the Attorney General 
delegated to the Director of the Executive Office of Immigration Review 
(“EOIR”) the power to  
[d]irect the conduct of all EOIR employees to ensure the efficient 
disposition of all pending cases, including the power, in his 
discretion, to set priorities or time frames for the resolution of 
cases; to direct that the adjudication of certain cases be deferred; 
to regulate the assignment of adjudicators to cases; and otherwise 
to manage the docket.160  
Indeed, in one case, a superior within the DOJ called the Chief Immi-
gration Judge and convinced him to direct an immigration judge han-
dling a controversial case to change his decision.161 Moreover, Attorney 
General Ashcroft in 2002 proclaimed that each member of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, the next level of review, “is a Department of 
Justice attorney who is appointed by, and may be removed or 
reassigned by, the Attorney General . . . as necessary to fulfill the 
Department’s mission.”162 Judges who disagreed with the Attorney 
General’s views on the propriety of asylum could be reassigned within 
the Department.  
Congress’s provision of decisional independence under the APA—
unlike in the immigration context—should be understood as a directive 
to preclude not only interference in pending cases, but also discipline 
arising from the substance of decisions, however poorly reasoned. This 
 
Eighth Circuit, many who had significant reversal rates, though much less 
than for SSA ALJs). 
158. For a recent congressional report castigating ALJ errors in decision 
making, see Misplaced Priorities: How the Social Security 
Administration Sacrificed Quality for Quantity in the Dis-
ability Determination Process, H.R. Staff Report, Comm. on 
Oversight and Government Reform 13–31 (2014). 
159. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 
Cornell L. Rev. 369, 371–79 (2006) (discussing the increasing lessening 
of “decisional independence” in immigration proceedings). 
160. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(ii) (2014). 
161. Legomsky, supra note 159, at 373. 
162. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002). 
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conclusion may seem counterintuitive, forcing agencies to retain ALJs 
who misstate agency policy or who fail to analyze cases carefully. The 
directive for decisional independence nonetheless places a buffer of 
protection around ALJs at least with respect to the analysis in their 
decisions. In establishing decisional independence, Congress presumably 
would not have anticipated discipline based on good faith efforts to get 
the decision right.  
Indeed, the MSPB on occasions other than in Anyel has been more 
sensitive to preserving decisional independence. In SSA v. Burris,163 the 
agency disciplined an ALJ who had provided claimants with a copy of 
warnings he had received from SSA due to his belief that the agency 
was not affording claimants due process.164 The MSPB stated that “[t]he 
ability of an administrative law judge to write decisions free from 
improper agency pressure is at the very core of an administrative law 
judge’s decisional independence” and that the managerial orders to the 
ALJ prohibiting him from sharing information with claimants intruded 
on his “decisional independence.”165 The buffer zone created by the 
APA’s decisional independence is critical to preserving the allocation of 
power between Congress and the President in superintending 
adjudicative systems delegated by Congress. 
For another example, consider the SSA’s rule providing that “[t]he 
ALJ must not use the decision as a forum for criticizing other 
government components, the courts, the representative or the claim-
ant.”166 There is no question that such a rule seeks to uphold the inte-
grity and respect for the adjudicative process. Although the rule is even 
handed, if the criticism is fundamental to explaining the decision, the 
SSA rule may blunt the independence envisioned by Congress. The 
issue arose in an arbitration questioning the legitimacy of discipline of 
an SSA ALJ for commenting in decisions that he had been instructed 
to make decisions after 900 days based on whatever was in the record, 
no matter if incomplete. If the 900-day policy indeed were in place, 
which was contested, then inclusion of that information in the decision 
to explain why other possibly relevant information was not included in 
the record would have been appropriate, despite the agency rule 
forbidding criticism.167 In a close case, courts and the MSPB should 
 
163. 39 M.S.P.R. 51 (1988). 
164. Id. at 60–61.  
165. Id. at 61; see also SSA v. Glover, 23 M.S.P.R. 57, 77 (1984) (declining to 
discipline ALJ for comment in decision critiquing SSA’s ability to 
generate an adequate record). 
166. Social Secutiry Administration, Hearing, Administration, and 
Litigation Law Manual I-2-8-25 (2005), available at http://www.ssa. 
gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-8-25.html. 
167. In re SSA and Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, 4, 5 (2011) (determining that 
decision to discipline ALJ Steven H. Templin was proper and not in 
violation of collective bargaining agreement between ALJs and SSA). 
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uphold the congressionally directed decisional independence at the 
expense of the managerial directives when the contents of the decisions 
are implicated. 
To be sure, agency managers would not want to give ALJs free rein 
to air grievances in decisions, but the MSPB or arbitrator must 
determine if the material in the decision is germane to the claim for 
disability. Agencies can still proceed against ALJs under a theory of 
insubordination if criticism in the decision is gratuitous and, of course, 
if the ALJ’s anger is manifested in other ways, discipline would be 
appropriate. 
This is not to suggest that the APA captures the balance between 
decisional independence and the executive’s need to manage judging 
optimally. One simple change would be for Congress to prescribe five- 
or ten-year terms in office for ALJs and provide that such terms be 
presumptively renewable. If an agency is convinced that an ALJ has 
erred consistently, it need not reappoint him or her to another term. 
Currently, even without any revision, ALJs who err should not be 
immune from retraining.168 Agencies in extreme cases can withhold new 
cases from the ALJs. 
If the APA does not apply, the executive branch can and has 
exerted closer control. In such contexts, the Due Process Clause stands 
as a critical check, but not all adjudicative schemes, such as the asylum 
claims, include an entitlement.169 In contrast to ALJs, the executive 
branch can provide for performance appraisals and assess the quality of 
non-APA officials’ judging. 
Finally, the salience of the APA’s provision for decisional indepen-
dence provides justification for the otherwise questionable statutory 
construction analysis in Portland Audubon Society v. Endangered 
Species Committee.170 There, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the 
APA provision forbidding ex parte contacts between an ALJ and “a 
person or party on a fact in issue”171 applied to the President and White 
House staff. The President argued that interpreting the APA to include 
White House staff within “person or party” would undermine his ability 
to control subordinates under Article II.172 Given that the Supreme 
Court the year before held that the President could not be considered 
 
168. Cf. Stephens v. MSPB, 986 F.2d 493, 495–98 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (dismissing 
an ALJ’s appeal of a decision to require him to attend additional training). 
169. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(v) (2014). This is not to suggest that Attorney 
Generals have exercised this managerial authority wisely. See, e.g., 
Legomsky, supra note 159, at 371–79 (criticizing the Attorney General’s 
managerial efforts in an asylum adjudication context). 
170. 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993). 
171. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012). 
172. Portland Audubon, 584 F.2d at 1546. 
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an agency subject to the APA,173 the executive branch’s statutory 
construction argument was plausible. Nonetheless, permitting ex parte 
contacts with White House staff unquestionably would blunt Congress’s 
intent in the APA to preserve decisional independence. The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, therefore, can be seen to implement the APA’s goal 
of decisional independence.174  
Conclusion 
In short, Congress has the power to limit the executive branch’s 
managerial authority over judicial officials more than they do over those 
officials engaged in enforcement and regulation. Congressional efforts 
to direct the process by which claims are to be adjudicated, as in the 
recent Veterans Administration example, eclipse the Article II interest 
in managing the executive branch. Moreover, Congress’s principal effort 
to shape adjudication in the executive branch—the APA—provides for 
a limited decisional independence for ALJs, which must at a minimum 
protect an ALJ’s ability to find facts without pressure from above. 
Congress’s specification of decisional independence should be construed 
to insulate ALJs from discipline for their analysis of the rules and facts 
at issue. 
 
 
173. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). 
174. See Vermeule, supra note 93, at 1222–23 (defending the ruling on grounds 
of “convention” as opposed to the intent expressed by Congress overall in 
the APA). 
